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HOME INCARCERATION UNDER ELECIRONIC
MONITORING: A STATUTORY REVIEW
As a result of the social changes of the 1960's,
American society viewed the purpose of the criminal justice
system as one of rehabilitation of the criminal, rather than
one focused exclusively on punishment.t With the increase in
crime in the 1970's, and the resulting fear, society's attitude
became more conservative toward the criminal justice system.'
As prisons become increasingly overcrowded, society must find
alternatives to incarceration.3 Ample statistics support the
need for solutions.' Localities faced with the prospect of
spending millions of dollars on new jails which offer little hope
of rehabilitating prisoners are responding to the public
demand for better criminal punishment with a focus towards
cost and program effectiveness.'
Home incarceration with electronic monitoring offers an
interesting alternative." Since its inception, home incarceration
1. Friel, Vaughn & Carmen, Electronic Monitoring and Correctional Policy: The Technology
and Its Application, National Institute of Justice Research Report 1 (June 1987). The authors
summarize the key characteristics of this period as viewing long-term incarceration as
counterproductive, with less of a need for incarceration for many, and a belief that
"community-based corrections are less expensive and at least as effective." Id.
2. Id. During this time, there was a desire to increase the probability of incarceration
as well as the duration of jail/prison time and an effort to prevent the incarcerated from
receiving early release. Id.
3. Corbett & Fersch, Home as Prison: The Use of House Arrest, 49 FED. PROBATION 13
(1985).
4. Baumer & Mendelsohn, A Comprehensive Evaluation of Electronically Monitored Home
Detention Programs (April 1986) (Proposal to the National Institute of Justice Research
Program and Corrections). "The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that at the end of 1984
state prison populations were at 110% of capacity. Between 1977 and the end of 1984, the
prison population in the United States increased by 54.6%." Id. at 1.
5. Schmidt, Use of Electronic Monitoring by Criminal Justice Agencies 2 (Nat'l. Inst. of
Justice Discussion Paper) (April 1988) [hereinafter Schmidt]. A new way in which states are
resolving the costs of new prisons and administrative overhead is to make use of privately
operated prisons. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1989, at A17, col. 3.
6. Home incarceration alternatively is called home detention, house arrest, home
confinement, residential confinement, or home release. Lilly & Ball, A Brief History of House
Arrest and Electronic Monitoring, 13 N. Ky. L. REv. 343, 343 (1987). These terms refer to
the process of keeping someone in their place of residence with permission to leave only for
specific predefined and approved purposes. Id.
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has been viewed by corrections officials as a means of
reducing the prison population7 and thereby creating jail space
for more serious offenders.'
However, this is not a simple "solution." Home
incarceration raises many questions. Opponents of home
incarceration assert that as soon as jail space becomes
available, those who are then under "house arrest" will be
imprisoned, regardless of whether they should have been
incarcerated initially.9 Also, a question is raised as to whether
punishment is being given in a manner consistent with their
crimes. Some criminologists fear that in the process the goal
of punishment shifts from one of rehabilitation to one of
surveillance and increased social control.10 A related issue is
the anticipated intrusion into the sanctity of the home." The
concern for the defendant's privacy is an important factor in
the various State Codes addressing home incarceration.
Other critics stress that placing convicted defendants
under "house arrest" does not guarantee that they will not
commit another crime. 2  According to these critics,
punishment requires a strictly enforced isolation in order to
keep the malevolent components of society apart. Groups such
as Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) assert that house
arrest results in a trivializing of the seriousness of the crimes
by imposing an inappropriately light sentence. 3 Reciprocity
is defeated if some offenders benefit from crimes, while
7. The first person was put on house arrest in 1984 in West Palm Beach, Florida.
Schmidt, supra note 5, at 2.
8. Friel & Vaughn, A Consumer's Guide to the Electronic Monitoring of Probationers, 50
FED. PROBATION 6 (1986).
9. Vaughn, Planning for Change: The Use of Electronic Monitoring as a Correctional
Alternative, in INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS: INTENSIVE SUPERVISION, HOME CONFINEMENT AND
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 160 (1987) [hereinafter Vaughn].
10. Petersilia, House Arrest, 1988 National Institute of Justice Crime File Study Guide 3
[hereinafter Petersilia].
11. Ball & Lilly, A Theoretical Examination of Home Incarceration, 50 FED. PROBATION
17, 23 (1986).
12. Petersilia, supra note 10, at 3.
13. Id.
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society pays.14
Advocates of home confinement stress other factors in
assessing its validity. It is thought that electronically
monitored home confinement achieves the goal of
incapacitating and controlling the home detainee. 5 Second,
electronically monitored home confinement qualifies as
retribution, because it inflicts more pain than simple probation
yet less than institutional incarceration."' As restitution, home
incarceration allows the offender to earn the income that can
serve to pay the victim for the harm caused by the
defendant. 7 As a simply humanistic result, the stigma of going
to jail is avoided. The offender is able to retain his
employment and support his family. 8 The pursuance of his
familial role potentially contributes to his rehabilitation.
The viability and interest in house arrest was greatly
enhanced by the advent of electronic monitoring equipment
that allowed for easier surveillance with greater control. 9
Electronic monitoring allows judges, probation departments,
and the public at large to be more comfortable with home
confinement." The number of offenders under electronic
house arrest in February 1989 was 6,490.21 In 1990, it is
estimated that at least 12,000 people will go under house
arrest in the United States.'
As more states enact legislative caps on prison
populations to prevent severe overcrowding conditions, and as
judges mandate solutions be found, the need for alternatives
14. Ball & Lilly, supra note 11, at 21.
15. Berry, Electronic Jails: A New Criminal Justice Concern, 2 JusT. Q. 1, 8 (1985).
16. Id.
17. Schmidt & Curtis, Electronic Monitors, in INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS, supra note 9,
at 139.
18. Vaughn, supra note 9, at 159.
19. Lilly & Ball, supra note 6, at 363.
20. Greacen, Principles for the Use of Electronically Monitored Home Confinement as a
Criminal Sanction, 1988 A.B.A. SEc. CRIM. JUST. 3.
21. House Arrest Seen As Solution for Crowding, NAT'L L. J., March 26, 1990, at 30.
22. Id.
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such as home confinement will expand. Other more
traditional alternatives include parole, probation, community
service, work release, half-way houses, and fines.24 House
arrest can be used in lieu of jail, as a split sentence, in
conjunction with work-release or as a condition of probation
and parole.' The manner in which home incarceration has
been implemented varies considerably from state to state, and
differences exist even within a particular state. One of the
variables that determines the character of a home
incarceration program with electronic monitoring is the type
of electronic equipment selected for the program.'
Electronic equipment is generally of two types: either
passive or active.' An active system refers to equipment that
provides continuous information as to whether an individual
is within range, generally 150 to 200 feet of the transmitter
located within their residence.' This is commonly referred to
as a continuously signaling device because the computer
monitor constantly receives signals allowing the probation
department or other facility to record an individual's presence
by use of conjunction with a computer printout.29
The offender wears a transmitter on his body, usually
around the wrist, ankle, waist, or neck. The transmitter, when
within range of the receiver-dialer connected to the telephone,
signals the central office computer.'
A passive system confirms the individual's presence in
23. See Friel, Vaughn & Carmen, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that courts have mandated
solutions in 39 states).
24. Pennell & Curtis, Electonic Surveillance: An Assessment of an Alternative to
Incarceration 5 (1986).
25. Petersilia, supra note 10, at 2.
26. See Schmidt & Curtis, supra note 17, at 145 (discussing the different types of
electronic monitoring equipment).
27. There are at least 16 vendors of electronic monitoring equipment currently on the
market. Vendors appear to be split fairly evenly between active and passive systems. See
Whittington, 2 OFFENDER MONrroRING, Spring 1989, at 30.
28. John, Electronic Surveillance Program, Clackamus County, Oregon Community
Corrections Evaluation 4-5 (June 16, 1987) (unpublished manuscript).
29. Id. at 5
30. Vaughn, supra note 9, at 155.
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his house only at the time that the computer randomly
contacts him.31 This is alternatively labeled a "programmed
contact system."32 In this system, an encoder device is also
worn on the body of the offender. Once contact is made over
the telephone, the encoder is inserted into a verifier box to
confirm that it is the specific offender who is present and
responding.33 Except in a few systems, a telephone is required
to transmit the signal.' Some devices, though, send signals via
radio or transmitter to a local area monitor or to a portable
receiver in a police officer's car.3"
Different legal or correctional problems arise depending
upon the type of system used. Generally, a passive system is
less costly to operate and has less technical difficulties than an
active system.' The major disadvantage to the passive system
is its feature of programmed random contact with the
offender. Depending upon its programmed frequency, it may
begin to intrude upon the offender and the offender's family
to such an extent that it could be considered an invasion of
privacy.
The analysis of privacy protected by the Fourth
Amendment has led to the drawing of a parallel between
home detainees and prisoners. If home detainee's rights are
considered to be co-extensive with that of prisoners, then their
constitutional protection is significantly diminished compared
to that of other citizens. The Fourth Amendment right of
people "to be secure in their persons, houses . .. against
unreasonable searches"37 has been linked to their "reasonable
31. Schmidt, supra note 5, at 16.
32. Id. at 16.
33. Vaughn, supra note 9, at 156.
34. See Schmidt & Curtis, supra note 17, at 139.
35. Id.
36. Technical difficulties arise from interference with metal objects such as mobile homes,
furnaces, or freezers. Also, power outages can cause erroneous signals between the computer
and the home. Friel & Vaughn, supra note 8, at 6.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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expectation of privacy."'  Further, "it is this distinction,
monitoring in a private versus a public place, which constitutes
a violation of the right to privacy."" Thus, speculation as to
whether there could be a Fourth Amendment violation
depends on whether or not electronic surveillance reveals the
same information that could not be discovered visually.' With
monitoring, this would depend in part on whether an officer
of the monitoring department could be there all the time and
whether he would have the right to remain there.
States have implemented various means of adapting
home detention with electronic monitoring. A survey of states
with electronic monitoring programs reveals that most have
instituted programs without specific authorizing legislation.
Instead these states implement programs through
administrative agencies or judicial discretion.' At this time, it
is estimated that ten states, Kentucky, Nevada, California,
Louisiana, Indiana, New York, Florida, Kansas, Illinois, and
Texas, have some form of direct legislation authorizing house
arrest with electronic monitoring. A basic difference among
these legislative acts is whether they simply authorize home
confinement with electronic monitoring or whether, in addition,
they mandate how it will be implemented.
Kentucky was the first state to enact legislation
authorizing home detention and electronic monitoring in April
1986.42 One of the principal motivations behind the legislation
was the desire to keep drunken drivers from experiencing the
criminogenic effects of prison life, such as association with
career criminals and the possibility of physical or sexual
assaults.43 The Kentucky legislation authorizes discretionary
38. Del Carmen & Vaughn, Legal Issues in the Use of Electronic Surveillance in Probation,
50 FED. PROBATION 60, 62 (1986) (discussing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)).
39. See iad
40. Id at 63.
41. Lilly, supra note 6, at 372. This allows for the possibility of inconsistent treatment
stemming from the idiosyncracies of different judges. Id.
42. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532 (Baldwin 1986).
43. Petersilia, supra note 10, at 2.
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home incarceration for all or a portion of a sentence of
imprisonment.' An offender of a misdemeanor may petition
the sentencing court for home confinement and the sentencing
court may rule upon the petition prior to the term or, at any
time throughout the term. 5 The maximum that a defendant
can be sentenced to home incarceration is six months.' All
home incarcerees must sign a written agreement containing
the incarceration conditions." If a detainee violates a
condition, the judge will conduct a hearing and, if a violation
is proven, order incarceration. '  Any time spent in home
incarceration is specifically authorized to be credited toward
the maximum term of imprisonment.49 As a condition of
home incarceration, a telephone or other approved monitoring
device must be maintained in the residence."
While the Kentucky act specifically refers to the petition
of a an offender of a misdemeanor to the court, a later
condition states that "no person convicted of a violent felony
offense shall be eligible for home incarceration." This creates
the impression that a non-violent felony offender is also
eligible for the program and it emphasizes the importance of
excluding violent felons.5 In making a decision to place a
particular misdemeanant in the program, a judge may consider
information supplied by the Misdemeanant Supervision
Department or county jailer; however, the judge makes the
final decision regarding a defendant. 2
An evaluation of a program for home detention in
Kenton County, Kentucky, revealed some of the problems that
44. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.210(1)(d) (Baldwin 1986).
45. Id. at § 532.210(1).
46. Id. at § 532.210(1)(d).
47. Id. at § 532.210(0(3).
48. Id. at § 532.210(e).
49. Id. at § 532.210(4).
50. Id. at § 532.220(6).
51. Id. at § 532.230.
52. Id. at § 532.210(1)(2).
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are encountered in instituting a program. 3 First, it is usually
the judge's receptivity to a program that determines whether
home incarceration will be used as a sentencing alternative. 4
In the Kenton County program, in the words of the jailer,
[h]ome incarceration was not used enough in the
front end ... as an initial sentence to depopulate
the jail . . . neither was home incarceration used
enough as a condition of work release out of jail,
which also depends on the approval of the
District Judge . . . the jailer liked home
incarceration and wished to use it as a condition
of work release without the approval of a judge.5
In other states, this authority is sometimes delegated to
the probation department by the judge. A tangential issue is
whether offenders are placed on the program as an alternative
to jail or whether the program simply provides a means to
"spread the criminal justice net."5 Kenton County tentatively
concluded that net-widening did not take place because 96%
of the home incarcerees had prior convictions in Kentucky."
As an important part of any such analysis, it is necessary to
determine whether, if an offender could have been sent to jail,
would he necessarily would have been?
The question often arises of whether an offender is
being sanctioned who ordinarily would not have been if the
newly available alternative of home detention did not exist. 8
Another part of this problem is not only that possibly more
53. Lilly, Home Incarceration with Electronic Monitoring in Kenton County, Kentucky: An
Evaluation, in INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND INTENSIVE
SUPERVISION 1 (1986).
54. Id. at 8-9.
55. Id. at 8.
56. Id. at 13. Net-widening refers to expanding the criminal justice system's control over
a greater number of people than would be possible under preexisting law under the pretext
that it is an alternative to incarceration. Id.
57. Lilly, supra note 53, at 13.
58. Schmidt & Curtis, supra note 17, at 146.
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offenders are being penalized than would have been otherwise,
but also that the sanction may be stiffer for the offense than
it would have been. Hence, it is a two-fold question of
absolute numbers of offenders and degree of severity.
A different view suggests that while the sanction might
be more severe than ordinary probation, the community gains
the benefit of increased protection."' Due to the chronic
prison overcrowding situation, some offenders who have
committed serious offenses and who are released on probation
are often found to have committed additional crimes while on
probation.' In examining whether home incarceration is
voluntary, the fact that the misdemeanant petitions the court
to request participation in the program"' and that there is a
requirement for a written agreement is important. 2
In defining "home," Kentucky does not exclude the
residence of a close friend or other non-family member.
"Home" is the "temporary or permanent residence of a
defendant consisting of the actual living area."' Further, the
legislation explicitly allows that a hospital, nursing care facility,
hospice, half-way house, group home, residential treatment
facility or boarding house may serve as a home.' This flexible
definition of home greatly increases a defendant's opportunity
to qualify for home incarceration. In particular, it increases
the chances for the indigent, elderly, or those requiring
medical treatment to qualify for home incarceration.
Another significant aspect of the Kentucky legislation
is the definition of an approved monitoring device. It must
be "minimally intrusive" and only provide information as to
the "prisoner's presence or non-presence in the home."'
59. Id.
60. Greacen, supra note 20, at 3, 8.
61. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.210(1) (Baldwin 1986).
62. Id. at § 532.210(0(3).
63. Id. at § 532.200.
64. id.
65. Id. at § 532.200(5).
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Furthermore, it must not be "capable of recording or
transmitting: a) Visual images b) Oral or wire communications
or any auditory sound; or c) Information as to the prisoner's
activities while inside the home." This limitation becomes
increasingly significant as technology advances and equipment
is marketed that exhibits these prohibited characteristics. At
present, such language would prevent the use of at least three
variations of monitoring equipment: the Hitek wristlet, the
Luma telephone, and any voice verification system.'
While this language restricts some vendor's access to
the market as well as limiting a supervising department's
selection in equipment, it represents the strongest guarantee
against an invasion of privacy that exists in any current
legislation. One reason for such a privacy concern would
come from the recording of a home detainee's voice. In a
program in Clackamus County, Oregon, a "telesol" wristlet
(now Hitek) was used as a monitoring device.' This device
features a computer with a prerecorded message identifying
the caller through questions and recording the call for later
review.' In this instance, the probation officer was tipped off
to the offender's altered state from hearing the recording,
which aided in discovering grounds for a subsequent
revocation.'
Similar legislation authorizing "residential confinement"
has been enacted in Nevada. 1 There, language virtually
identical to Kentucky's statute bans the use of similar types of
66. Id.
67. In the I litek wristlet system, a robot caller asks questions and the answers are taped
for voice verification. The Luma Interactive Monitoring system consists of a visual phone
display that sends images that are digitalized and printed for record-keeping. Different images
combined with gestures are required to positively identify the individual. See generally Lilly,
Nevada's Law Reconsidered, I OFFENDER MONITORING. Feb./March 1988, at 18 (discussing the
pros and cons of the law and the type of prohibited equipment).
68. John, supra note 28, at 9.
69. Id at 6.
70. Id. at 9.
71. NEV. REV. STAT. § 4.440 (1987).
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electronic equipment.' It is unclear whether this was
purposefully chosen to insure the same degree of protection
is unclear. However, because the Nevada legislation is
patterned after Kentucky's,' it is believed that it will reinforce
the original Kentucky legislation.
Nevada's statute differs from Kentucky's statute in the
category of offender it prescribes for residential confinement.
Probationers who violate their conditions may be placed in
residential confinement in lieu of being sent to jail or prison.74
In addition, a judge may sentence a misdemeanant to
residential confinement "in lieu of imposing any punishment
other than a minimum sentence mandated by statute."" Unlike
Kentucky's law, which does not refer to minimum statutory
sentence time, the Nevada law requires that residential
confinement for a misdemeanant only replace other forms of
punishment when a minimum sentence is not required or,
perhaps, following such a sentence.' Because a minimum
sentence cannot be replaced with a sentence of residential
confinement, it would appear that it is less of an alternative
to incarceration for misdemeanants. For probationers and
parolees who are placed on the program after a violation has
occurred, it would seem to be a true diversion from
incarceration.
72. Id. at § 4.440(3). This section provides that:
An electronic device approved by the department of parole and probation
may be used to supervise a convicted person sentenced to a term of
residential confinement if it is limited in capability to recording or
transmitting information concerning the person's presence at his residence
and is minimally intrusive. A device which is capable of recording or
transmitting:
a) Visual images;
b) Oral or wire communications or any auditory sound; or
c) Information concerning the person's activities while inside his residence
must not be used.
Id.
73. See generally NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4.440 (Michie 1986-87) (stating that the Nevada
legislation was patterned after the Kentucky statute).
74. See id. at § 176.2231.
75. Id. at § 4.440(1).
76. Id.
1990]
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In either category, the legislation provides that an
offender shall not be ordered to residential confinement unless
he so agrees." The Board of Parole, not a judge, decides
whether to order residential confinement in lieu of suspending
parole for a parolee.
Unlike any other state with electronic monitoring
legislation, Nevada specifically authorizes the court to "contract
with a qualified person to administer a supervision program
for persons who are sentenced to a term of residential
confinement" who are in the misdemeanant category.' Such
authorization to contract with a non-state agency could protect
a private company from liability. A problem might arise if an
independent company were providing the state with electronic
surveillance services when a home incarceree committed an
offense during the confinement.' Legal action might be based
upon a claim of negligence resulting from either lack of
supervision or lack of response after an observed violation or
series of violations occurred. This scenario has been
considered by critics and alluded to in comparison with the
responsibility of a state run facility.' A work release facility
was found to have neglected its duty when an offender
kidnapped a woman at random." The Nevada statute would
not necessarily remove liability for demonstrated negligence,
however, it might afford the independent contractor a similar
degree of protection as that enjoyed by a state agency.
The California legislature has apparently reconsidered
its position on types of permissible electronic monitoring.
Originally, California enacted legislation to authorize and
77. Id. at § 176.2231(4).
78. Nevada Senate Bill 88, section 13, Feb. 1987.
79. Whittington, Is a Private Monitoring Service for You?, 1 OFFENDER MONITORING, May
1988, at 21.
80. Collins, Can Electronic Monitoring Create Liability by an Embarrassment of Riches? 1
OFFENDER MONITORING, May 1988, at 8. Mr. Collins sets forth a fact pattern whereby a
monitoring agency has readily available capability to observe an infraction of home
incarceration curfew hours and fails to take action, thereby incurring potential liability. Id.
81. Id. (discussing Doe v. United Social and Mental Health Services, Inc., 670 F. Supp.
1121 (D. Conn. 1987)).
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implement a pilot project using electronic monitoring.' This
statute limited an electronic monitoring device to one capable
only of "recording or transmitting information as to the
prisoner's presence in his home."' Later, Assembly Bill No.
3686, also known as the "Mojonnier-Ayala Electronic Home
Detention Act of 1988,"s changed the type of equipment that
could be used in later projects. This statute requires that the
equipment must be for the "purpose of helping to verify his
or her compliance" with the program and "shall not be used
to eavesdrop or record any conversation, except a conversation
between the participant and the person supervising the
participant which is to be used solely for the purpose of voice
identification."'  It is not clear whether this legislation would
allow a computer to substitute for a "person" in order to
permit the use of a passive, random contact voice verification
system. However, it is evident that in the later California
legislation an effort was made to address potential privacy and
search and seizure concerns. The inclusion-of "eavesdropping"
and "record[ing] any conversation" manifests an intent to guard
against some of the fears inspired by a potential 1984
Orwellian world.
Another noteworthy aspect of the California law is the
adoption of a fee for monitoring services based upon ability
to pay.' Excluding some offenders from a home detention
program, due to their indigency, could provoke an Equal
Protection challenge.87
In a recent Pennsylvania Superior Court case,
Commonwealth v. Melnyk,' a violation of due process under
82. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.015(4)(d) (Deering Supp. 1988). However, this legislation
was only operative until January 1, 1990:
83. Id.
84. Id. at § 1203.016.
85. Id. at § 1203.016(b)(3).
86. Id. at § 1203.016(g).
87. Del Carmen & Vaughn, supra note 38. at 66-67.
88. See Legal Issues, 2 OFFENDER MONrrORING, Spring 1989, at 21 (discussing
Commonwealth v. Melnyk, 44 CrL 2002 (Pa. Super Ct. 1987)).
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the 14th Amendment was found where a pretrial detainee was
excluded from a pre-trial diversionary program because she
was not deemed capable of paying user fees." Only California
law states that "inability to pay shall not preclude participation
in the program."
An interesting twist touching upon the Equal Protection
issue reportedly occurred in a pre-trial detainee program in
Dade County, Florida, when a court attempted to order a
defendant to use an electronic home detention system.9' Upon
being informed that no monitoring units were available the
court asked the defendant whether he would like to buy the
units, which he agreed to. Therefore, the defendant's
affluence facilitated access to a special program that might not
otherwise have been available to him.
Minimum security inmates, low-risk offenders and work-
furloughees are eligible for home detention in California. At
the time of sentencing, a judge may "restrict or deny a
defendant's participation in the home detention program."'
Thus, while a court retains some control as to the disposition
of offenders in a program, it is the correctional administrator
who must conclude that a person meets the criteria for
releaseY This allows for greater input from the correctional
administrator than in other states. Presumably, rather than
simply have the court hear the recommendation of the
correctional department, California requires that the
correctional administrator must first conclude that the
applicant has satisfactorily complied with "reasonable rules and
regulations" while in custody.'
89. See id.
90. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.016(g) (Deering Supp. 1990).
91. Renzema, Equal Protection, 1 OFFENDER MONITORING, March 1988, at 14.
92. Id. It was also noted that Dade County does not in fact charge for the use of their
program and that the aforementioned equipment was later donated to the program. Id.
93. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.016(a) (Deering Supp. 1990).
94. Id. at § 1203.016(f).
95. Id. at § 1203.016(d).
96. Id.
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Indiana has recently adopted elaborate legislation
authorizing home detention with electronic monitoring as a
condition of probation imposed by the courtY The
"Community Corrections Home Detention Fund" established
a home detention fund for each county containing a
community corrections program issuing user fees and grants.'
At the end of the fiscal year, these funds will help assure the
continuity of the program." Additionally, the Act specifies an
elaborate reporting system whereby the individual probation
departments detail the number of people on the program as
well as their success and failure rates, subsequent dispositions,
expenditures, and monies collected to the judicial conference
of Indiana annually."° The mandatory reporting of costs of
home detention with and without electronic monitoring to the
judicial conference also furthers cost effectiveness. The
judicial committee compiles this information into usable
statistical data. ' This is the only legislation specifically
requiring such reporting and guaranteeing continued research
into its effectiveness.
Indiana's home detention program provides a true
alternative to incarceration. Either the probation department
or a community corrections program can supervise home
detention."° First-time suspendable class C and D felons are
eligible candidates for their entire sentence." Class D felons
with prior unrelated class C or D felonies can, within some
time parameters, have their normally nonsuspendable
minimum sentence suspended to participate in home
detention.'" This is also true for class D felons with
nonsuspendable sentences because of prior juvenile
97. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-2-2(15) (Bums Supp. 1988).
98. Id. at §§ 11-12-7-1 - 11-12-7-2 (Burns 1988).
99. Id. at § 11-12-7-4.
100. Id. at § 11-13-1-4.
101. Id. at § 11-13-1-4(7)(8).
102. Id. at § 35-38-2.5-5(c).
103. Id. at § 35-38-3-5(4)(a).
104. Id. at § 35-38-3-5(2).
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convictions."t Because home detention is designed for felons,
and normally nonsuspendable minimum sentences can be
suspended if home -detention is ordered, the statute should
create a true alternative to incarceration and not merely act
as an add-on condition of probation.
First time class C and D felons can serve their entire
sentence, if so ordered, under home detention.' Unlike the
Kentucky statute, which specifies a maximum of six months,"
the Indiana statute requires a minimum period of sixty days of
home incarceration and a maximum not to exceed the
minimum time of imprisonment for the crime committed."
One of the conditions required in the statute is for detainees
to undergo medical, psychiatric, or treatment programs if so
ordered by the court, thereby solving the problem of habitual
substance abusers."° Currently, the offender must pay a home
detention fee as set by the court and have a telephone."'
There is no provision expressly allowing for the inclusion of
indigents as there is in the California statute."'
Other noteworthy terms of the Indiana statute include
the specification of the type of monitoring device to be used
in the "home." "Home" does not include "the residence of
another person who is not part of the social unit formed by
the offender's immediate family."'1 The monitoring equipment
105. Id. at § 35-38-3-5(3).
106. Class C and D felons can be sentenced up to two years. Id. at § 35-38-2.5-5(a)(b).
107. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.210(1)(d) (Baldwin 1986).
108. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-2.5-5(a)(b) (Bums 1988). A study commenced in July
1986 involving offenders of non-violent class C and D felonies (such as forgery, burglary,
prostituion, and driving while intoxicated) in Marion County, Indiana should be completed
shortly and provide interesting information on the felon program. At the time of the study
proposal, criteria for eligibility varied somewhat from the current legislation. The program
was not available to class D felons with nonsuspendable sentences; the offender could not be
a habitual substance abuser, and employment or school attendance was required for the
program. The Indiana statue does not expressly exclude these conditions, although presumably
they could be included as other conditions of probation.
109. Id at § 35.38.2.5-6(1)(c).
110. Id. at § 35-38-2.5-6(6)(7).
111. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.016(g) (Deering 1988).
112. IND. CODE ANN. at § 35-38-2.5-2 (Bums Supp. 1988).
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affords some protection for the privacy rights of the offender.
It must be limited to the recording or transmitting of
information regarding an offender's presence or absence; it
must be "minimally intrusive" upon the privacy of the offender
or "other persons residing in the offender's home."' This is
the first legislation to address the possible privacy and search
or seizure rights of the offender's family.
Another unusual point in the Indiana law is the
necessity of obtaining the written consent of both the offender
and the other persons residing in the home at the time an
order for home detention is entered."' It is unusual for the
written consent of the offender's co-habitants to be required,
and it is also unusual that once obtained, the monitoring
conditions can be dramatically altered. Once written consent
of all parties is given, a monitoring device's role may be
expanded to that of recording or transmitting the following: a)
visual images, b) oral or wire communication or any auditory
sound, or c) information regarding the offender's activities
while inside his home."5 This is the only statute which permits
the monitoring under any condition of activities inside the
home. It is important to bring the offender's family into the
decision making process in order to facilitate a successful
period of home detention. However to allow an expanded
form of monitoring would appear to create a greater potential
for abuse to the innocent family members. In addition to the
potential for an intrusion on the offender's privacy, there is
the possibility that it is an unreasonable condition of
probation."6
An additional notification requirement for electronic
monitoring was imposed perhaps in anticipation of a challenge
113. Id. at § 35-38-2.5-3(1)(2).
114. Id. at § 35-38-2.5-3(3).
115. Id. at § 35-38-2.5-3(3)(a)(b)(c).
116. See generally Del Carmen & Vaughn, supra note 38, at 64. Four general elements
have emerged from case law which validate a condition of probation. In order for a condition
to be acceptable, it must be clear, reasonable, constitutional, and protective of society and/or
rehabilitative of the probationer. Id.
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to the monitoring process."7 Prior to the entering of a court
order, the offender and persons residing in the house must
be informed of the "nature and extent of electronic
surveillance provided.""' By securing additional consent the
privacy of the offender is addressed.
Louisiana recently adopted a new code of criminal
procedure authorizing home incarceration and electronic
monitoring."9 This law is unique because it authorizes home
incarceration as a direct sentencing option, rather than as a
condition of probation. It specifically states that a person can
be sentenced to home incarceration "in lieu of
imprisonment."'" A defendant is a candidate if eligible for
probation or if convicted of a misdemeanor or a felony
punishable "with or without hard labor."' Apparently, the
clause "with or without hard labor" was inserted in order to
include first time offenders who would not have been eligible
for a term of incarceration normally and, yet, are subject to
home incarceration." This may create a risk of enlarging the
criminal justice net, however, it is too early to predict the
practical effect of this law due to the recent adoption of the
code by Louisiana."
Since October 1988, the Baton Rouge City Court has
been placing misdemeanants in its house arrest system. The
program utilizes monitoring equipment that sends computer-
generated visual images over telephone lines to the probation
department."' There is no prohibition against the use of this
117. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-2.5-11 (Burns Supp. 1988).
118. Id.
119. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 894.2 (West Supp. 1989).
120. Id. at art. 894.2(a).
121. Id. at art. 894.2(1).
122. This interpretation of the clause in the legislation was suggested in conversation with
Dr. Archiambault of Louisiana State University in January 1989. He serves on the Pardon
and Parole Board.
123. LA. CODE CRIM PROC. ANN. art. 894.2 (West Supp. 1989).
124. Conversation with Chief Probation Officer Mary Milsap in December 1988.
125. Id. Currently, the program is using visual equipment made by Visatel. Id.
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equipment because the home incarceration article does not
define what types of monitoring devices are permitted."
Unlike the Indiana statute, the Louisiana code specifies that
any condition of home incarceration shall be "reasonably
related to implementing or monitoring a sentence of home
incarceration, including curfew, electronic or telephone
monitoring."'27 The Baton Rouge house arrest program also
requires that the offender maintain a telephone and retain
employment." For an offender to be placed on home
incarceration, the "court determines that home incarceration
of the defendant is more suitable than imprisonment or
supervised probation without home incarceration."'" This
clearly indicates that home incarceration would be considered
apart from probation as a sentencing alternative. The code,
however, draws a parallel between home incarceration and
probation when a violation occurs. "In the event of revocation
and sentence to imprisonment, the defendant shall not receive
credit for time served under home incarceration."' The
requirement that the defendant agree in writing to the
conditions of home incarceration negates the possibility of an
involuntary sentence.'
Also, Louisiana has started a test of electronic
monitoring in the Community Control Program. This is a
joint effort by the United States Bureau of Prisons, the United
States Parole Commission, and the United States Probation
Service.3 ' The Middle District of Louisiana Probation Office
in conjunction with four other district offices of the United
States Probation Service is experimenting with the granting of
early releases from prison of periods between sixty and ninety
126. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-2.5-3(3)(a)(b)(c) (Burns Supp. 1988).
127. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 894.2(C) (West Supp. 1989).
128. Id. at art. 842.2.
129. Id at art. 894.2(a)(3).
130. Id at art. 894.2(l).
131. Id at art. 894.2(D).
132. United States Parole Commission, Community Control Program (Oct. 6, 1988).
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days. The release is directly into home monitoring programs.
In order to be placed in the program, releasees must sign an
agreement. 133 This agreement stipulates that alcohol or drugs
are prohibited unless for medical purposes.1" The intent
behind the program is to relieve prison overcrowding and
determine whether home electronic monitoring will be a viable
alternative to the currently used method of releasing inmates
through the Community Treatment Centers.35 If this type of
a program is implemented on the federal level, it may have a
significant impact on prison overcrowding.'
In order to significantly alleviate their prison
overcrowding, Florida has had legislation to develop a
"Community Control" program since 1983.137 This act allows
for the withholding of sentence and imposition of probation
where appropriate."3 If a felony is involved the offender may
be placed in a community control program if probation is an
inappropriate alternative. 39 When this law was amended in
1985, it clarified that no defendant placed on probation for a
misdemeanor may be placed under supervision of a
community control program unless there is a specific finding
that it is necessary to protect the community or to rehabilitate
the offender is established. " ' This appears to reflect a direct
attempt to prevent superfluous social control or net-widening.
In Mitchell v. State of Florida,"' the Florida District
133. Louisiana Community Control Program, Co-Residents Agreement, form cc-9 (1988).
134. Id.
135. United States Parole Commission, supra note 132, at 2 (in conjunction with a
conversation with Robert Sibille, Chief United States Probation Officer, Middle District of
Louisiana.)
136. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 894.2 (West Supp. 1989).
137. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948 (West 1985). This section was enacted through session laws
of 1983, c.83-131, § 11. Id.
138. Id. at § 948.01(3). Specifically, the court considers the likelihood of a recidivist act,
the ends of justice, and the welfare of society, to determine whether to impose the law penalty
or to place the offender on probation. Id.
139. Id. at § 948.01(4).
140. Id. at § 948.01(3) (West Supp. 1989). This section was amended by Laws 1985, c.
85-288, § 14.
141. Mitchell v. State of Florida, 463 So. 2d 416 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1985).
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Court of Appeals reiterated that the intent of the Florida
Legislature was to provide an alternative to incarceration
through community control. Also, the Florida court held that
probation and community control are two distinct concepts,
not to be used interchangeably with each other.42
Another point raised by the Florida legislation is the
maximum time period that an offender can be placed in a
Community Control program. In Florida, this has been
restricted to two years.4 3 This raises questions of what goals
are trying to be achieved; those of retribution or merely those
of fulfilling a sentence requirement." In a Palm Beach
County program, time spent in jail compared to time spent in
"community control," has been established on a one to three
ratio.'4' According to the results of a study in Kentucky, judges
have invoked the same one to three ratio for ordering home
incarceration.' This suggests that on a program by program
basis, a proportionality between the jail sentence and the
home incarceration sentence is being formed. Beyond the
proportionality issue, a humanitarian concern has been raised
that excessively long periods of confinement might have a
detrimental effect on the individual. This could be true not
only in total number of months but also in number of hours
per day; 24 hours could be counterproductive.'47 It is perhaps
in response to this type of concern that maximum time periods
have been set legislatively.
Florida's limitation of a two year period was examined
in Davis v. State of Florida.'" In this case, the defendant was
originally sentenced to five years of "community control," but
142. Id. at 419.
143. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.01(5) (West Supp. 1989).
144. Schmidt & Curtis, supra note 17, at 146.
145. Id. Thus, three days of monitoring is equivalent to one day in jail.
146. Lilly, Ball, & Wright, Home Incarceration with Electronic Monitoring in Kenton
County, Kentucky: An Evaluation, in INrERMEDATE PUNISHMENTS: ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE AND INTENSIVE SUPERVISION 16 (1986).
147. Vaughn, supra note 9, at 166.
148. Davis v. State of Florida, 461 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1984).
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the Florida District Court of Appeals subsequently reversed
and remanded the case for sentencing according to the
legislative maximum two year period. However, in Mick v.
State of Florida,49 the Florida District Court of Appeals
interpreted this act to apply only to individual sentences and,
thus, affirmed the imposition of two consecutive two-year
sentences for separate offenses."
Only offenders convicted of forcible felonies or those
with past records of forcible felonies are ineligible for the
Florida program.'' An exception is made for offenders with
convictions of drunk driving, manslaughter or burglary.' The
conditions of "community control" indicate that treatment is
available for offenders found guilty of sexual battery against
a child, exploitation of a child, or a lewd or lascivious assault
or act upon a child.' This includes offenders that some other
programs hesitated to include.'54 Other conditions include the
submission to random testing for alcohol or controlled
substances.'
Interestingly, Florida has experienced a recent decline
in the number of people on house arrest.56  Inmates,
considering the proportionality issue in conjunction with the
intense surveillance, have elected to remain in prison, rather
than transfer to house arrest. 7 With a "good time reduction,"
the shorter the sentence is more palatable to that of house
arrest."8
The Florida Act does not place specific limitations on
149. Mick v. State of Florida, 506 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1987).
150. Id. at 1122.
151. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.01(12) (West 1989).
152. Id.
153. Id at § 948.03(6).
154. For example, the Nassau County Probation Department does not put sexual
offenders in its home detention program. Interview with Beatrice Soman, Public Information
Officer, Probation Department, Mineola, New York (December 1988).
155. FLA. STAT. ANN. §948.030) (West Supp. 1989).
156. Supra note 21, at 30.
157. Id
158. Id
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the range of monitoring capabilities of the electronic
monitofiing equipment. As a condition of "community control,"
the court may require supervision through an electronic
monitoring device.'59 It is the court, not the Department of
Corrections, that determines who shall wear a monitoring
device. Unlike other legislation focusing on privacy concerns,
Florida's legislation' looks to certain technological standards,
such as water-resistance, which must be met before the use of
a device."
The Kansas legislature passed a bill authorizing a house
arrest program using either a passive or active monitoring
device.' However, other than authorizing electronic
monitoring, this legislation has no distinctive provisions.
Texas has authorizing and enabling legislation which
establishes funding for electronic home detention programs.62
Home detention may be used for parolees or probationers.
The Texas code provides that in order to divert defendants
from confinement and to provide intensive probation,
programs for probation may be funded." Hence, in some
instances, the judge must first make a finding that the
sentence is in fact an alternative to jail before sentencing to
home detention and electronic monitoring. This provides a
means for the Texas program to act as a diversion to
incarceration in the department of corrections.
Another potential area for the implementation of home
detention and electronic monitoring involves pre-trial
detainees. As of this time, only Illinois has made legislative
provision for this category of defendant on a state-wide basis."
159. Id. at § 948.03(2)(d).
160. Id. at § 948.03 9 (a)(b)(c). These include: 1) capability of full operation on a back-
up power source for 8 hours 2) a tamper-resistant strap guarding against removal and an
antenna system which prevents interruption of the transmitter signal from body shielding, 3)
the transmitter must not weigh more than 6 ounces; it must be water-resistant, sealed, and
shockproof. Id.
161. 1988 KAN. SESS. LAWS 115.
162. TEx. CRM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 42.18 28(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
163. Id. at § 42.121 (3.11).
164. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 110-10, 14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989).
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The Illinois legislation, which became effective January 1,
1989, also authorizes home confinement for certain offenders
as a condition of probation and conditional discharge with or
without an electronic monitoring device." In both instances,
the use of an electronic monitoring device must be minimally
intrusive and is "primarily intended" to provide information as
to the defendant's presence or non-presence in the home.' "
The same restrictions on monitoring equipment capabilities
found in the Kentucky and Nevada statutes are present in
Illinois. In addition, like the Indiana statute,"7 unless the
defendant and all other co-habitants give written consent,
information about the defendant's activities inside the house
is prohibited."
In Lake County, Illinois, Pre-trial Services, a branch of
the probation department, has been operating a pre-trial
program for three years.'" According to the department,
electronic monitoring aids the supervision program and allows
for the placement of more serious offenders." The program
is designed for felony offenders who have been unable to post
bond.' The program uses a steady signal monitoring device
that provides continuous information as to the defendant's
presence in his house." The department staff checks a
computer printout during normal working hours from seven
a.m. to nine p.m.t" Otherwise, the readout is checked in the
morning for possible violations that have occurred during the
previous night.'74
165. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-6-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
166. Id. at para. 1005-6-3, 10.
167. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-2.5-3 (Bums Supp. 1988).
168. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-6-3, 10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
169. Information about the program was provided by Judy Kirby of Pre-trial Services,
Lake County, Illinois.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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A pre-trial detainee may successfully prove that home
detention is a violation of the Eighth Amendment right against
cruel and unusual punishment or Fourth Amendment
protection against search and seizure. It has been alleged that
there is no relevant parallel between the status of prisoners
and that of monitored individuals. Therefore, a simple transfer
of recognized rights from one category to the other cannot be
made.'75 Because the primary purpose of a bond is to insure
the appearance of the defendant in court, there should be no
punitive aspect to the confinement.76 A similar Eighth
Amendment challenge could be raised to the net-widening
issue. Because punishments are to be proportional to crimes,
if a statistical analysis revealed that a greater number of
offenders were being incarcerated in the home who had
previously received no similar punitive sanction, then it might
be considered disproportionate to the offense.
The gravamen of any challenge is the view of home
incarceration as an additional sentencing option, an add-on
condition to probation, or as an alternative to incarceration.
The character applied to the confinement would determine
the outcome of these questions. In one of the few cases
brought concerning home confinement, People v. Thompson,'"
a pre-trial detainee in Lake County, Illinois, sought to receive
sentence credit for the time he spent in home incarceration
pursuant to the Unified Code of Corrections as it gives credit
for time spent in custody. The Illinois Appellate Court acted
in accordance with an Illinois Supreme Court decision of
People ex. rel. Morrison v. Sieloff'8 determining that "custody"
is equivalent to confinement. The Thompson' court
established what confinement meant.". While the Thompson
175. Berry, More Questions and More Ideas on Electronic Monitoring: Response to Lilly,
Balk and Lotz, 3 JusT. Q. 363, 367 (1986).
176. Id. at 359 (discussing Bell v. wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)).
177. 174 III. App. 3d 496, 528 N.E.2d 1016 (III. App. Ct. 1988).
178. 58 I11. 2d 91, 316 N.E.2d 769 (1974).
179. Thompson, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 496, 528 N.E.2d at 1016.
180. Id. at 1017.
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court did not define exactly what type of confinement or
facility could substitute for jail, it reaffirmed a previous
decision which set a bottom threshold level of what would not
be confinement. 8'
The Thompson Court agreed with the findings of fact
considered by the trial court pointing out that on eighteen
occasions, the defendant was not at home when checked."
This leaves a doubt as to what their conclusion might have
been had the defendant been home each time he was
checked. Rather than addressing the general nature of home
confinement, the court looked to the specific facts of the
situation.
There has been scant legal consideration of exactly how
electronic computer printouts can be used in obtaining a
revocation of the home confinement sentence. In a
Westchester County, New York program, the offender must
sign a form which allows a computer printout to constitute
prima facie evidence of a violation.1" It is unclear if this would
be counted as prima facie evidence in court.
In the only case dealing with electronic monitoring and
the requirements of evidence, People v. Ryan,' the court
indicated that "[m]ore in depth scientific and technical
testimony may be necessary in a case where a defendant
charged with a violation of the electronic home monitoring
program has not made an admission or in an instance where
there is an issue of credibility pertaining to a claimed
admission."" In this setting, the revocation was based on
outside evidence from the probation officer and from the
defendant himself. Thus, whether an inclusion in a consent
form would be sufficient to allow a revocation based on a
181. People v. Tillery, 141 Ill. App. 3d 610, 490 N.E.2d 967 (1986).
182. Thompson, 174 III. App. 3d at 496, 528 N.E.2d at 1017.
183. Westchester County Department of Probation, Electronic Home Monitoring
Introduction, Agreement to Comply with Rules and Regulations of Probation Electronic Home
Monitoring Program, Appendix 2 (1988).
184. 134 Misc.2d 343, 510 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Cty. 1987).
185. Id. at 349, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
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readout alone is unclear.
An effort to determine the rights of those in home
detention programs, particularly home detainees, is confused
by legislation such as that passed in New York in July 1987.1'
This bill authorized the placement of pre-trial detainees in
home detention when the combined correctional facility
population exceeds that capacity by one percent. 7 The New
York legislation requires through a consent agreement form
stating that participation in the program is a "privilege," that
random drug and alcohol tests may be performed, that
unannounced searches are part of the program, and that
electronic monitoring may be ordered.' To date, this
program has not been implemented. However, with strict
conditions such as alcohol and drug testing imposed, one
might expect higher risk defendants to be placed on the
program. Current eligibility requirements exclude detainees
charged with a class A or B felony or violent felony offense."
Detainees may be terminated from the program at any time,
regardless of any violations." This presents grounds for a
due process challenge since the legislation specifically adds
that no program "shall be subject to judicial review."9 '
Placement in the program is not through a judge but rather
a three-member panel selected by the Correction Department,
provoking political controversy." New York legislation
provides that "while in a detainee program, the detainee shall
be deemed to continue in the custody of the department. '
This would seem to be in accordance with sentence credit
186. N.Y. CoaRcR. LAW § 161 (McKinney Supp. 1989).
187. Id. at § 162.
188. Id. at § 163.6.
189. Id. at § 161.4.
190. Id. at § 164.2.
191. Id. at § 163.9.
192. See House Arrest: Low Risk or High?, N.Y. Daily News, Dec. 29, 1988, at C16, col.
193. Berry, supra note 172, at 366.
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under a recent Illinois interpretation.1
Recently, the American Bar Association addressed the
issue of electronically monitored home confinement as a
sentencing option and invoked guidelines for its
implementation.'" These guidelines seek to ensure that the
sanction is the least restrictive and most feasible. Also, they
create "a rebuttable presumption that individuals who would
have been placed on probation in the past should not be
sentenced to electronically-monitored home confinement."1
This addresses the concern that the degree of sanction will be
increased needlessly because the technology is present.
Further, "because the potential for economic bias is so
great," ability to pay is foreclosed as a basis for determining
sentencing eligibility.
Interestingly, with the exception of the foregoing
concern of the American Bar Association("ABA") the
sentencing goals of the ABA are not expressly formulated in
any current legislation. However, New York State has two
experimental programs establishing guidelines effecting many
of the same sentencing concerns.' These establish that
offenders are to be selected for the program who would
ordinarily serve at least twelve months in jail.'" These criteria
194. See People v. Thompson, 174 III. App. 3d 496, 528 N.E.2d at 1016 (1988).
195. Greacen, supra note 20, at 1.
1. A sentence may include home confinement monitored by an
electronic monitoring device if the judge finds, on the record, that such
electronic monitored home confinement is the least restrictive alternative
which should be imposed consistent with the protection of the offense.
2. In no event should a court or probation office automatically require
electronic monitoring as a condition of probation.
3. The ability of an individual to pay for the use of an electronic
monitoring device should not be considered in determining whether to
require the use of such a device when imposing sentence.
Id. at 1-2.
196. Id. at 4.
197. Id.
198. See New York State Division of Probation and Correctional Alternatives Implementation
Plan for Electronic Monitoring Demonstration Projects (Albany, New York 1988).
199. New York State Division of Probation and Correctional Alternatives, Guidelines for
Home Confinement with Electronic Surveillance I (Albany, New York 1988).
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are to be met by statistically analyzing sentencing practices in
the specific area.' Further, it is set forth that it will be
available only to felony offenders "for whom no other
alternative, or combination of alternatives, would suffice as
substitutes for the period of confinement.""1 These guidelines,
based on statistical sentencing patterns, most closely
approximate the sentencing goals of the ABA and ensure at
home confinement with electronic monitoring can be used as
an alternative sentence.
Guidelines vary from state to state. States without
legislation have even greater variables and less assurance that
the rights of the offenders are being considered. Through
legislation, greater uniformity is developed and potential
problems are addressed. Compilation of the best elements of
all current statutes would probably be the most effective
means to enforce the law in this area. There are some areas,
such as sentencing equivalents for home detention, that has
not been examined by any state's legislature. As part of the
investigation into sentencing guidelines, whether home
detention is a proportionate response to all the categories of
offenders placed on the program should be examined more
closely. Once this is determined, it is essential to insure that
home incarceration is no more intrusive than necessary. The
average sentences currently imposed in home incarceration
appear reasonable, however attention should be given to
insure that the home environment is not distorted by an
excessively long sentence.
When properly employed, home incarceration is a
humanitarian response to standard incarceration. A-s more
studies are completed, evaluations of the effectiveness of
programs in terms of cost, recidivism, and the lessening of
overcrowding will be forthcoming. Perhaps, home detention
could combine aspects of retribution with rehabilitation and
200. Id. at 5.
20 1. New York State Division of Probation and Correctional Alternatives, Guidelines for
Home Confinement with Electronic Monitoring I (Albany, New York 1988).
1990]
314 JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. VII
show a lower rate of recidivism. Also, if employed as an
actual alternative to incarceration, home detention would
reduce prison overcrowding and be an effective solution to the
problem of prison overcrowding as long as it did not develop
into incarceration generally.
Alicia M. Grace
